Abstract A distinction is drawn between situations as indices required for semantically evaluating sentences and situations as denotations resulting from such evaluation. For atomic sentences, possible worlds may serve as indices, and events as denotations. The distinction is extended beyond atomic sentences according to formulae-as-types and applied to implicit quantifier domain restrictions, intensionality and conditionals.
Introduction
There are two ways situations provide an alternative to the classical view of a proposition as a set of possible worlds. These ways are most readily understood if, given some collection W of possible worlds, we reformulate a proposition p W as its characteristic function v p : W ! f0; 1g mapping a possible world w 2 W to a truth value v p ðwÞ 2 f0; 1g indicating whether or not w belongs to p revised by introducing situations into the function's domain, as indices, or into the function's range, as extensions or denotations.
As crisp as the distinction between the domain and range of a function is, the line between indices and denotations gets blurred when functions are loosened to relations, as in the relation theory of meaning adopted in Barwise and Perry (1983) . The precise details of the relation theory of meaning have changed over the years (Perry 1997; Ginzburg 2008) , but a key ingredient that has remained is the described situation. Described situations are presented in Barwise and Perry (1983) as an alternative to truth values, identified (since Frege) as the denotations of sentences (which for the moment we conflate with statements). Described situations can also serve as indices insofar as linguistic expressions may be evaluated relative to them. It is this use of described situations that informs Kratzer's ''possibilistic versions of situation semantics'' by which she means conservative extensions of possible worlds semantics that construe propositions as sets of world parts, rather than complete possible worlds (Kratzer 2008) .
The aforementioned world parts are situations, relative to which the truth of a sentence is evaluated according to a binary relation support between situations s and sentences A support(s, A) iff A is true at s.
The difference with the Carnap-Montague intension i A : W ! f0; 1g of a sentence A is simply that the possible worlds mapped by i A to truth values are replaced by situations. While the indices change, the denotations remain the same-namely, truth values. Kratzer uses a partial order p on situations to sharpen the relation support to a relation exemplify that can be equated with Davidsonian event predication in ''those special cases where the sentences that are related to exemplifying situations are atomic.'' 1 Interestingly, linguistic expressions analyzed in terms of event predication (such as verbs) are often described in the literature as eventdenoting. Event-denoting linguistic expressions take us back to the idea of situations-as-denotations, provided we count events as special kinds of situations.
The present work employs situations as indices and denotations alike, mapping a sentence A to a set ½½A i of denotations, given a suitable list i ¼ i 1 ; . . . ; i n of indices i k . Exactly what ''suitable'' is depends on the sentence A, as will become clear below. The details to follow flesh out the intuition that ½½A i relativizes exemplification of A to i, with s i-exemplifies A iff s 2 ½½A i and truth at i underpinned by i-exemplification in that A is defined to be true at i precisely if some situation i-exemplifies A A is true at i iff ½½A i 6 ¼ ;:
As denotations, situations exemplify; as indices, situations support, by virtue of their role as subscripts in ½½A i .
Outline
Denotations are drawn in Sect. 2 from events to more complicated objects constructed according to the formulae-as-types interpretation from proof theory (Sundholm 1986; Troelstra and Schwichtenberg 2000) . Rather than basing exemplification, as in possibilistic situation semantics, on dubious assumptions about the partial order p on situations, we construct pairs and functions as denotations. The result is arguably what Dekker (2004) (among others) advocates, ''an extended dynamic approach'' that integrates the cases from Lewis (1975) with eventualities (referred to below as events, for simplicity).
2 In Sect. 3, we shift our focus from situations-as-denotations to situations-as-indices, incorporating intensionality and possibilities into formulae-as-types, while connecting truth to the partial order p . In Sect. 4, an approach to conditionals is outlined that brings together situationsas-indices with situations-as-denotations, evaluating antecedent and consequent relative to a common index that links their denotations. We conclude in Sect. 5 with some words on situation types and on denotations beyond truth.
An example from possibilistic situation semantics
Before proceeding to the details behind ½½A i , let us pause to consider example (1a) from Kratzer (2008) , a conditional with antecedent (1b) and consequent (1c).
(1) a. Whenever a man rides a donkey, the man gives a treat to the donkey.
b. a man rides a donkey c. the man gives a treat to the donkey Among the challenges posed by (1) are (q1) how to interpret (in a principled way) the definite descriptions the man and the donkey and (q2) how to connect the antecedent (1b) to the consequent (1c) for a proper reading of whenever in (1a).
We answer (q1) in Sect. 2 below, and (q2) in Sect. 4 (taking up issues concerning truth and intensionality in Sect. 3). In the remainder of this section, we review the analysis of (1) in Kratzer (2008) . (The reader not especially interested in possibilistic situation semantics may skip ahead at this point to Sect. 2.) The set of situations supporting the antecedent (1b) of (1a) is given by (2).
(2) ks 9x 9y ½manðxÞðsÞ^donkeyðyÞðsÞ^ð9e p sÞ rideðyÞðxÞðeÞ In (2), manðxÞ and donkeyðyÞ are evaluated relative to a situation s, while rideðyÞðxÞ is evaluated relative to an event e that is p -part of s. Whereas e is understood to exemplify rideðyÞðxÞ, s exemplifies neither manðxÞ nor donkeyðyÞ. But in order to pick out a unique man and a unique donkey for the definite descriptions in (1a)/(1c), we take a p -minimal situation from the set defined in (2). This is the approach to (q1) taken in possibilistic situation semantics. As for (q2), (1a) is an instance of (3a), of which ''the standard analysis'' is (3b), where the relation exemplify is derived from the relation support through p -minimization, (3c).
(3) a. Whenever A, B b. ks ð8s 0 p sÞ exemplifyðs 0 ; AÞ ' ð9s 00 ! p s 0 Þsupportðs 00 ; Bðs 0 ÞÞ c. exemplifyðx; AÞ iff supportðx; AÞ^ð8y < p xÞ:supportðy; AÞ (3b) is the set of situations that support (3a), just as (2) is the set of situations that support (1b). In (3b), s represents the described situation for (3a), called the (Austinian) topic situation in Kratzer (2008) , that restricts the A-exemplifying situations s 0 under consideration to be p -part of it. Similarly, in (2), s is the described situation for (1b) that p -bounds e. For the event e to be ''a maximal spatiotemporally connected event of riding y by x,'' 3 Kratzer puts (3c) aside, restricting the event quantifier in (2) through a ''suitable counting criterion'' that bans ''nonidentical overlapping individuals.'' Other examples from Kratzer (2008) that pose a challenge for defining exemplification as in (3c) are listed in (4).
(4) a. Whenever a cat eats more than one can of Super Supper in a day, it gets sick. b. Every time I sell between two and five teapots on a single day, I am entitled to a $5 bonus. c. Whenever nobody showed up, we canceled the class.
In each sentence in (4), we must be careful about using the described situation of the antecedent to restrict quantification, as minimizing over that situation can be problematic. For an effectively null restriction, Kratzer takes ''the actual world as a whole'' as the ''resource situation'' for Super Supper in (4a) and for teapots in (4b) (appealing, for (4c) , to ''contextual restrictions'' such as ''those contributed by the topic-focus articulation and presuppositions''). To evaluate it in (4a), however, the antecedent's described situation is retained as a resource situation for cat before minimizing according to (3bc). Now, the basic thrust of Sect. 2 below is to sidestep complications with p -minimization by proceeding not from support and (3c), but from exemplify, applying (5) to derive support from exemplify (rather than the other way around).
(5) supportðx; AÞ iff ð9z p xÞexemplifyðz; AÞ In fact, the full account below is slightly more complicated than (5), as exemplification is relativized there also to an index i (not to mention persistence complications, discussed in Sect. 3 .2 below). But insofar as we can put the index i in ½½A i aside, we can assert (5) alongside the equivalence exemplify(s, A) iff s 2 ½½A (allowing the relative priority between support and exemplify to be reversed).
Types and denotations
We focus in this section on situations as denotations, initially suppressing the index subscript i in ½½A i and writing simply ½½A. We distinguish between the object language of formulas to be interpreted and the meta-language where the interpretation takes place. Our meta-theory is ordinary set theory in classical logic, no different from the Montagovian tradition in formal semantics. We take it for granted that given sets I and J, we can form the set I Â J ¼ fhi; ji j i 2 I and j 2 Jg of pairs from I and J, as well as the set I ! J ¼ f f j f is a function with domain I and range Jg of functions from I to J. We follow the custom of writing f : I ! J instead of f 2 I ! J, but otherwise reserve : for the object language and 2 for the metalanguage. See Table 1 , which is explained incrementally in this section. 
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Denotations minus indices
Under the formulae-as-types paradigm from proof theory, a formula A is a type whose members are its proofs so that we may (i) formalize 'a is a proof of A' in the object language as 'a : A', and (ii) interpret 'a is a proof of A' in the meta-language as a 2 ½½A translating the object language expressions ''type'' and : to ''set'' and 2 respectively, while assuming that ½½a ¼ a (for simplicity, lest we distinguish a ¼ ½½ _ a from its name _ a). The obvious question is what is a proof, in partial reply to which we can say a proof of an implication A ' B is a function mapping proofs of A to proofs of B and a proof of a conjunction A^B is a pair ha; bi of a proof a of A and a proof b of B.
That is, in the meta-language, we have (6).
The connective ' provides a first approximation to the English words if. A useful refinement is to allow the consequent B to vary with ''choices'' from the antecedent A. This step leads to an analysis of Geach's donkey sentence (7a) largely along the lines (7b) of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993) .
(7) a. If a x farmer owns a y donkey, he x beats it y .
The problem posed by (7a) is that the indefinites a farmer and a donkey in the antecedent must be available for pronominal reference in the consequent. DRT's solution is to devise a box (8b) for the antecedent (8a) declaring discourse referents x and y, over and above the truth conditions farmerðxÞ, donkey ðyÞ and own ðx; yÞ.
(8) a. a x farmer owns a y donkey
Rather than reviewing the formal details behind (7b) and (8b), we shall construct formulas that produce the same effect (and more). The idea is to extend the interpretations of A ' B and A^B in (6) to universal and existential quantification ð8x : AÞBðxÞ and ð9x : AÞBðxÞ, agreeing that a proof of ð8x : AÞBðxÞ is a function f mapping a proof a of A to a proof of BðaÞ and a proof of ð9x : AÞBðxÞ is a pair ha; bi of a proof a of A and a proof b of BðaÞ.
To capture the dependency of BðaÞ on a proof a of A, we work with a set-valued functionĴ with domain I, and define dependent forms ð Q i 2 IÞĴðiÞ and ð P i 2 IÞĴðiÞ of I ! J and I Â J (respectively), putting functions that map i 2 I to objects inĴðiÞ into Notice that ifĴ is the constant function mapping each i 2 I toĴðiÞ ¼ J, then
Accordingly, we say (6) generalizes to (9).
(9) a. ½½ð8x :
In (9), BðaÞ is assumed to be a type for every a 2 ½½A. For instance, given a unary predicate R over a type O of objects (or entities e in Montague grammar), we can form ð9x : OÞRðxÞ to say there is a proof of RðaÞ for some a 2 O. It will be convenient to form the subtype
of O, interpreted according to (10), assuming BðaÞ is a type for every a 2 ½½A.
(10) ½½fx : AjBðxÞg ¼ fa 2 ½½A j ½½BðaÞ 6 ¼ ;g
We can now rewrite (8b), the DRT box for (8a), as (11).
(11) ð9x : farmer O Þð9y : donkey O Þ ownðx; yÞ
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To interpret (11) (Kamp and Reyle 1993) , we can write 'x : ownða; dÞ' for x is an ownða; dÞ-event(uality). See Table 2 . Next, the DRT analysis (7b) of the donkey sentence (7a) becomes (12), where l and r are functions mapping pairs hi; ji to their left and right components, i and j, respectively lðhi; jiÞ ¼ i and rðhi; jiÞ ¼ j:
(12) ð8z : ð9x : farmer O Þð9y : donkey O Þ ownðx; yÞÞ beatðlðzÞ; lðrðzÞÞÞ Notice that the formula in (12) has the form ð8z : AÞB, with A instantiated to the formula in (11), and B containing terms lðzÞ and lðrðzÞÞ that range over farmers and donkeys, as outlined in (13a-c), where three typing conclusions (to the right of the turnstile j À) are drawn from the typing assumption 
A record type is essentially a context such as that occurring to the left of j À in (13a-c) assigning variables types. More generally, contexts are generated simultaneously with pairs ðC; AÞ of contexts C and formulas A, written
and pronounced 'A is a type relative to C,' such that (c1) the empty sequence is a context (assigning no variable a type), and (c2) whenever C . A and x is a variable not already assigned a type in C, the concatenation of C with the typing x : A, written C; x : A is a context (assigning x the type A).
In other words, a context is a finite sequence of variable typings
where for each i n, x i is a variable different from x j for 1 j < i, and (9) and (10) that BðaÞ is a type for every a 2 ½½A. If we read C . A as 'C satisfies the presuppositions of A' then (15ab) can explain why neither (16a) nor (16b) presupposes John is married even though John's wife is lucky does (Beaver 1997; Ranta 1994; Fernando 2001) .
(16) a. If John is married, John's wife is lucky. b. John is married and John's wife is lucky.
Denotations as indices and contexts as types
From the incremental build-up (c2) of contexts and lines such as (13) of the form C j À t : A, it is clear that although : is binary, there can be any number of background assumptions behind a typing statement t : A. These assumptions constitute an index i for the set ½½A ¼ ½½A i interpreting A. The index is implicit in the interpretation (9) of ð8x : AÞB and ð9x : AÞB, which we make explicit in (17) through subscripts.
In (17), the denotation a in ½½A i appears as an index in ½½B i;x=a although not in ½½ð8x : AÞB i or ½½ð9x : AÞB i . The substitution BðaÞ in (9) is expressed through the subscript x=a on ½½B i;x=a in (17), paralleling the expansion in (15) of the context C (for ð8x : AÞBðxÞ and ð9x : AÞBðxÞ) to C; x : A (for BðxÞ). Indeed, a context C can be viewed as a type of indices, interpreted as a set ½½C such that (i) for C equal to the empty sequence ;, ½½C ¼ f;g and whenever A is a type relative to C, C . A,
(ii) we can interpret A, relative to every i 2 ½½C, as a set ½½A i , and (iii) ½½C; x : A is the set consisting of elements i of ½½C extended to map x to an element of ½½A i ½½C; x : A ¼ f'i; x=a' j i 2 ½½C and a 2 ½½A i g (Table 3 ). A context C does not require an index for interpretation, but a formula A that is a type relative only to a non-empty context does. A variable x in a formula A translating an English sentence may represent a dependence not only on anaphora but also on speaker, addressee, speech time, speech location or some other deictic element.
As the formulation (9) of (17) In (18c), we identify (18a) and (18b) with their respective translations as formulas (for simplicity). The equation in (18c) fails to explain an important difference between (18a) and (18b)-(18a) is indisputable in a way that (18b) is not (e.g. [Kaplan 1989] ). But then (18c) leaves out any account of the constraints on utterances of (18a)-namely, that I is the speaker. To correct this defect, we might structure the indices into situations such as utterances (in accordance with Barwise and Perry's relation theory of meaning), imposing suitable requirements on these situations for a proper context. We shall not do this here, but shall consider in the next section what it means for a formula to be true.
Indices and intensionality
In possible worlds semantics, the truth of a proposition p is evaluated relative to a possible world w.
(pw) p is true at w iff w 2 p
Under formulae-as-types, truth is nothing more than the existence of a proof.
(at) A is true iff there is a proof of A-i.e. ½½A 6 ¼ ; Compared to the formulation (pw) of truth in possible worlds, it would appear (at) describes a notion of truth that is absolute, leaving out any qualification or notion of possibility. In fact, however, as we observed in Sect. 2.2, a formula A is, in general, interpreted relative to a list i ¼ i 1 ; . . . ; i n of indices, turning (at) to (rt).
(rt) A is true at i iff ½½A i 6 ¼ ;
The interpretation ½½A i of a formula A is fixed according to Table 4 once the interpretations of its atomic subformulas are fixed. But how are the interpretations ½½u i of atomic formulas u fixed? Formulae-as-types is silent on this question, and it is far from clear how to choose one interpretation of say, farmerðaÞ over another. If ½½Á i cannot be determined from i alone, we ought perhaps rewrite (rt) to (Rt).
(Rt) A is true at ½½Á; i iff ½½A i 6 ¼ ;
The choice of ½½Á in (Rt) essentially corresponds to a possible world w in (pw), fixing, for instance, the interpretations of farmerðaÞ, donkeyðdÞ and of ownða; dÞ. To formalize variations in the interpretation of A, it suffices to expand the n-ary predicates in A to ðn þ 1Þ-ary predicates with a fresh possible world argument x 0 , turning, for instance, ownða; dÞ into ownða; d; x 0 Þ, and interpreting ownða; d; x 0 Þ relative to x 0 =½½Á as ½½ownða; dÞ. The general idea (familiar from Montague) is to ''intensionalize'' A into a formula A 0 ðx 0 Þ where a novel variable x 0 occurs freely. In the present framework, we require that whenever ½½A i is a set (i.e., whenever i 2 ½½C for some context C such that C . A), A 0 ðx 0 Þ is interpreted relative to x 0 =½½Á; i as ½½A i , yielding (RT).
(RT) A 0 ðx 0 Þ is true at x 0 =½½Á; i iff ½½A i 6 ¼ ;
The pair ½½Á; i in the left hand side of (Rt) becomes the list x 0 =½½Á; i of indices for A 0 ðx 0 Þ in (RT). Furthermore, the interpretation of A 0 ðx 0 Þ is fixed by the list x 0 =½½Á; i of indices. The problem above of applying (rt) to A ¼ farmerðaÞ (leading to (Rt)) goes away when farmerðaÞ is expanded to farmerða; x 0 Þ and ½½Á is smuggled in through x 0 =½½Á.
In the present section, we will consider different choices of ½½Á that can be made through a set bSitn of basic situations to be described shortly. For each basic situation s 2 bSitn, the instantiation of x 0 given by s will be written ½½Á s , clashing with the notation above for ½½Á i . But as the only index that will concern us in the remainder of this paper is the instantiation of x 0 , we will tolerate the clash, and will 
Atomic formulas and partially ordered situations
Let U be a set of atomic formulas u with no variables (all arguments being instantiated, as in the case of farmerðaÞ and ownða; dÞ, so that apart from the instantiation of x 0 via s, u can be interpreted without i, reducing the subscript on ½½Á to s). Let us work with the intuition that a denotation in ½½u s is a way u is true that is part of s, so that the equivalence (19a) comes down to (19b).
(19) a. u is true at s iff ½½u s 6 ¼ ; b. u is true at s iff there is a way u is true that is part of s
Suppose that we could abstract s away from ½½u s to pick out a subset kuk of bSitn consisting of ways u is true, and that part-of is given by a partial order p on bSitn.
(20) a. The set kuk of ways u is true is a subset of bSitn. b. p partially orders bSitn and a p s says: a is part of s.
Then it is plausible to equate ½½u s with the set of situations in kuk that are p -contained in s, whence it follows from (19a) that u is true at s exactly if there is way u is true p -contained in s.
(21) a. ½½u s ¼ fa 2 kuk j a p sg b. u is true at s iff ð9a 2 kukÞ a p s
But how are we to meet the assumptions (20ab) on which (21) rests? A simple answer that will suffice for our present purposes 4 is to let (i) bSitn PowerðUÞ consist of subsets of U (ii) fug be the only way u is true kuk ¼ ffugg (iii) p be the subset relation so that under (21b), s ¼ fu 2 U j u is true at sg for every s 2 bSitn. To formulate the notion of a U-world, it is useful also to build negation into U, and require basic situations to respect it, leading respectively to (22) and (23). (The formulas in U may, if the reader prefers, be called basic, rather than atomic.) (22) Every u 2 U has a negative form u 2 U different from u (u 6 ¼ u), whose negative form u is u (u ¼ u).
(23) For every s 2 bSitn, whenever u 2 s, u 6 2 s.
We can arrange (22) by doubling predicate symbols, if necessary, expressing negative extensions via the additional predicates. Complementing the U-noncontradictoriness (23) imposes on every basic situation, we define s 2 bSitn to be a U-world if s is U-complete inasmuch as for all u 2 U, u 2 s or u 2 s:
An immediate consequence of (23) is that U-worlds are -maximal elements of bSitn and that for every U-world s, u 2 s iff u 6 2 s for all u 2 U. Without a constraint such as (23), we run the risk that bSitn has exactly one -maximal element, U. We can extend negation Á beyond U, defining We take up a basic obstacle to the generalization (24) next.
Non-persistence and index-denotation pairs
An immediate consequence of (24) As is well-known, however, persistence is problematic for universal formulas A. Consider (25).
(25) Every mistake was corrected. ð8x : mistakeÞ correctedðxÞ While (25) might be true at a situation s, it would fail if we extend s to include a mistake that was not corrected. Although existential quantification does not (in itself) pose problems for persistence, we should think twice about asserting (24) for existential formulas, given that U is assumed closed under Á-negation and that ð9x : AÞB is universal.
In view of the untenability of (24) for arbitrary formulas A, a more useful set to associate with A than kAk ¼ S s2bSitn ½½A s is the set jAj ¼ X s 2 bSitn ½½A s of pairs hs; ai of s 2 bSitn and a 2 ½½A s . (That is, a denotation a is coupled with the index s inducing the set to which a belongs.) Given a set I bSitn of basic situations, we might then define A is I-possible iff ð9i 2 IÞ A is true at i iff ð9p 2 jAjÞ lðpÞ 2 I where l, recall, extracts the left component s of a pair hs; ai.
Conditionals via denotations and indices
The points about conditionals of interest in the present section are most conveniently made by moving from the donkey sentence (7a) to example (26) from Kratzer (2008) . (7) a. If a x farmer owns a y donkey, he x beats it y .
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(26) Whenever a x man rides a y donkey, the x man gives a treat to the y donkey.
(26) illustrates the usefulness in associating events with predicates. These events are written e and e 0 in the treatments (27abc) of (26) paralleling the analyses (7b), (12) and (14b) of (7a) from Sect. 2.
In Kratzer (2008) , (26) is analyzed by identifying the set of situations supporting (28a) with (28b).
(28) a. Whenever A, B b. ks ð8z p sÞ exemplifyðz; AÞ ' ð9v ! p zÞsupportðv; BðzÞÞ (28b) restricts the A-exemplifying situation z to be p -contained in s, and requires the BðzÞ-supporting situation v to p -contain z. Assuming that supportðx; XÞ iff X is true at x exemplifyðx; XÞ iff x 2 kXk for atomic X so that supportðx; XÞ iff ð9u p xÞ u 2 kXk for atomic X (not unlike (5) from Sect. 1.2), we can reduce (28b) to (29) provided A and BðzÞ are atomic.
(29) ks ð8z p sÞ z 2 kAk ' ð9v ! p sÞð9u p vÞ u 2 kBðzÞk For atomic A and BðzÞ, the sole difference between (29) and the set (30) of situations s at which ð8z : AÞBðzÞ is true is that (30) simplifies v in (29) to s. To defend this simplification, we consider modifications to the antecedent A and to the consequent BðzÞ in turn.
Spelling out implicit restrictions
To ensure that both the A-exemplifying situation z and the BðzÞ-exemplifying situation u in (30) are p -bound by the index s in ½½ð8z : AÞBðzÞ s , we can express whatever restriction s makes on z over and beyond that on u explicitly in A. In the case of (26), this may involve adding to A a condition vðx; y; eÞ specifying, for instance, the spatio-temporal location of x; y and e.
The spatio-temporal location of the antecedent event may differ from that of the consequent-as illustrated by the elaborations (32) of (26), for which I thank an anonymous referee.
(32) a. Whenever a x man rides a y donkey in the desert, the x man gives a treat to the y donkey. b. Whenever a x man rides a y donkey in the desert, the x man gives a treat to the y donkey before entering the desert. c. Whenever a x man rides a y donkey in the desert, the x man gives a treat to the y donkey after returning from the desert.
The reader resistant to partializing worlds into situations might note that (31a) is not interpreted in Kampe and Reyle (1993) relative to a situation. That is, one may assume the index s in ½½ð8z : AÞBðzÞ s is a full world, given that restrictions such as vðx; y; eÞ above might be added to the antecedent A. Such an assumption is, however, not necessary under the present framework. Nor is it clear to me what closure conditions on indices s can safely be taken for granted. 5 What is clear is that restrictions on conditionals are routinely left implicit, but that uncovering these restrictions is often (if not always) the key to understanding the claims at stake.
Linking the antecedent to the consequent
If the antecedent A of a conditional ð8z : AÞBðzÞ might be extended to step from (27) to (31), the consequent BðzÞ too might be extended to explicitly connect the situations exemplifying the antecedent and the consequent. Hence, the step from (31) to (33), for some connection Rðe; e 0 Þ implicit in (26).
A problem with (31c) that (33c) is intended to fix is that under (31c), a single giveTreatðz:x; z:yÞ-event e 0 may be associated with two different rideðz:x; z:yÞ-events e 1 and e 2 . This is fine if e 1 is p -part of e 2 , but not if e 1 and e 2 are p -part of two distinct p -maximal rideðz:x; z:yÞ-events. One approach then is to ensure that the events in question are (as Kratzer 2008 puts it) maximal spatiotemporally connected. In particular, we might revise the basic clause defining ½½A s , replacing ½½u s for atomic u by the set ½½u Understood as an index for evaluation, the described situation is notoriously difficult to pin down. Its slippery nature lies at the heart of the treatment of the Liar paradox in Barwise and Etchemendy (1987) .
The main claim of this book is that the explicit introduction of the parameter for the described situation allows us to see quite clearly why the Liar behaves in the way it does. We have shown that if it is used to make a claim about some particular portion of the world, it always gives you a fact that lies outside the portion being described. (Postscript to the second printing of Barwise and Etchemendy 1987) It would appear the Liar may provide a counter-example to the assumption above that the index s through which x 0 is interpreted contains all the denotations it indexes.
(assuming every element of ½½u s has a p -maximal extension). Working with nonoverlapping rideðz:x; z:yÞ-events, we might then require R to be 1-1 in that whenever Rða; bÞ and Rða 0 ; bÞ; a ¼ a 0 :
Or, rather than simply requiring R to be 1-1, we might flesh it out, reading Rða; bÞ as 'b is a consequence of a.' But whatever ''consequence'' means exactly, note that the temporal relation between the antecedent and consequent situations can vary-a point about when familiar from Moens and Steedman (1988) . In (32b) and (34a), the A-events happen after the B-events, whereas in (32c) and (34b), they happen before.
(34) a. Whenever John won, Mary predicted it. b. Whenever John won, Mary reported it.
When saying that A-events happen after or before B-events, we have in mind a particular pairing of A and B-events. In particular, (34a) and (34b) can both be true, which we can report as (35a).
(35) a. Whenever John won, Mary predicted and reported it. b. Whenever John won, Mary predicted or reported it.
(35a) shows that the consequent B need not consist of a single event (understood as having an interval for its temporal trace), while (35b) suggests that we had better not fix a particular temporal ordering between A-and B-events. Nevertheless, some connection R between A-and B-events is required to keep (26) from being true simply because the man gave a treat to the donkey some time in the past.
(36) a. Whenever a man rides a donkey, the man gives a treat to the donkey for the ride. b. Whenever a man rides a donkey, the man gives a treat to the donkey after the ride. c. Whenever a man rides a donkey, the man gives a treat to the donkey before the ride. d. Whenever a man rides a donkey, the man gives a treat to the donkey within two days of the ride.
(36a) links a ride to a treat more tightly than does (36b) or (36c); a treat can lie in the future (or past) of several rides, as the past (future) of a treat stretches indefinitely far back (forward). Specifying a temporal measure as in (36d) helps, but our tendency to equate (26) with (36a) illustrates the importance of some loosely causal configuration of events, called an episode in Moens and Steedman (1988) . 6 6 It is noteworthy that causation is the motivation in Schubert (2000) for distinguishing exemplify from support (or, in Schubert's terminology, characterize from describe) and developing that distinction beyond atomic sentences.
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Although (26) is compatible with both (36b) and (36c), there are examples where a temporal relationship between A and B can be inferred from an episode. A pushcauses-fall episode is the basis in Asher and Lascarides (2003) for assigning (37b) the push-and-then-fall interpretation given to (37a).
(37) a. Mary pushed Max. He fell.
b. Max fell. Mary pushed him.
We can flesh out a relation R left implicit in Whenever A, B along lines similar to that in the calculation of rhetorical relations (even though (38a) and (38b) are by no means equivalent in the way (37a) and (37b) are).
(38) a. Whenever Mary pushed Max, he fell. b. Whenever Max fell, Mary pushed him.
Such calculations can be avoided in cases where a connection between A and B is spelled out, as in (39).
(39) a. Whenever Mary pushed Max, he fell as a result. b. Whenever Max fell, it was because Mary pushed him.
But just as a sequence of unrelated sentences lacks coherence (e.g. Hobbs 1979 ), a conditional with a consequent that is completely disconnected from its antecedent is arguably ill-formed. Stepping from ð8z : AÞ BðzÞ to ð8z : AÞð9v : BðzÞÞ Rðz; vÞ, we require that a situation z in the denotation ½½A map to a situation v in the denotation ½½BðzÞ relative to an index supporting the connection Rðz; vÞ. 
Conclusion
It is not uncommon for a semantic account based on possible worlds to eschew the formal use of events (e.g. Dowty 1979) or for an analysis employing events to make do without mentioning possible worlds (e.g. Kamp and Reyle 1993) . This may, in part, be due to the differing aims of the accounts. Above, we have brought together possible worlds and events, as situations (broadly construed), presenting possible worlds as indices and events primarily as denotations, without restricting indices to possible worlds or denotations to events. Indeed, the type-theoretic approach to anaphora reviewed in Sect. 2 largely concerns denotations given by pairs and 7 Is a link between antecedent and consequent situations required because the word whenever suggests repeated occurrences? So-called anankastic conditionals S&b ( (2001) link antecedent and consequent situations in a particular way without overt use of whenever. Fleshing out that connection is arguably crucial to their interpretation. As an anankastic conditional, (40a) is to be read as (40b).
(40) a. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A-train. b. If you want to go to Harlem then if you go to Harlem, you must, as part of going to Harlem, take the A-train.
functions (rather than events, understood as denotations of atomic formulas), and forms indices from denotations to update contexts. The crucial point behind the distinction between denotations and indices is that denotations exemplify what a sentence is about, whereas indices support the truth of sentences. The structural complexity of denotations reflects the complexity of the sentences they exemplify; for atomic formulas, denotations are indices and their p -parts (Sect. 3), while for universal and existential formulas, denotations are functions and pairs (Sect. 2). This fine structure on denotations is useful not only for anaphora (Sect. 2) but also for connecting the consequent of a conditional to its antecedent (Sect. 4). More generally, denotations may serve as main eventualities underlying rhetorical relations for discourse coherence (Asher and Lascarides 2003) .
Can we make do with the truth sets tr(A) ¼ fs 2 bSitn j A is true at sg ¼ fs 2 bSitn j ½½A s 6 ¼ ;g rather than the full set ð P s 2 bSitnÞ½½A s of index-denotations pairs? For atomic sentences u, we can recover ½½u s from trðuÞ ½½u s ¼ fa 2 trðuÞ j a p sg given the partial order p on bSitn. As noted in Sect. 3.2, however, complications with persistence block such a reduction for universal sentences A. Are there other grounds for doubting denotations can be reduced to truth sets? In an influential, early critique of Barwise and Perry (1997) , Soames points out that if direct reference is possible and propositional attitude verbs have a relational semantics, then the semantic values of sentences (objects of propositional attitudes) cannot be collections of truth-supporting circumstances (whether these circumstances be possible worlds or situations) but rather are single, composite entities with structures related to those of the sentences that express them. They are, I suggest, essentially Russellian propositions. (Soames 1985, p. 63) . Under the present proposal, the semantic values are neither collections of truth-supporting circumstances nor the Russellian propositions Soames suggests. They are instead collections of exemplifying situations.
8 Collections rather than ''single, composite entities'' are arguably more faithful to the spirit of the Austinian view that a sentence is mapped to a type (or collection) of situations by the language's descriptive conventions. It is a separate, contentious matter whether or not demonstrative conventions always single out a described situation (Ginzburg and Sag 2000, p. 93) . Types containing more (or less) than one situation are compatible with the claim that a unique event need not be described by a statement,
